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A B S T R A C T
Both China and the US have developed distinct governance processes to address environmental issues.
The dominant processes of environmental governance in China take the form of (i) many laws but state
planning is dominant and (ii) intermediate crisis scanning procedures and policy responses on an
irregular or episodic basis outside the confines of the Five-Year Plans or other national plans. The parallel
processes in the US involve (i) law-centered practices including the enactment of legislation, the
promulgation of regulations, and the judgments of courts and (ii) federalism/multi-level governance
featuring initiatives/innovations at national and sub-national levels of government and policy diffusion.
These institutionalized governance processes are more deeply embedded in the political and social
systems of the two countries than the range of factors commonly considered in discussions of policy
instruments. Both sets of institutionalized governance processes produce successes in addressing
environmental problems under some conditions and failures under others. But the determinants of
success in the two systems are not the same, and there is no reason to expect the two systems to
converge during the foreseeable future. The analysis of environmental problem solving in China and the
US illustrates the power of the general idea of institutionalized governance processes as a basis for
research on comparative politics in a wide range of settings.
 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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In this article, we argue that China and the United States have
developed distinct processes to fulfill needs for governance and§ This essay reflects discussion occurring at a workshop on environmental
governance held at Tsinghua University in Beijing, 20–21 March 2014.
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0959-3780/ 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.that these institutionalized governance processes constitute the core
of the system operating in each country to address environmental
issues. While China has many environmental laws, state planning
constitutes the key process in environmental governance. The US, by
contrast, relies first and foremost on a set of law-centered processes.
Both systems are rooted in the historical experiences and cultural
practices of their respective societies. Both produce successes under
some conditions and failures under others, though their track
records to date are not strictly comparable. But the determinants of
success in the two systems are not the same; the implications for the
selection of specific policy instruments are different, and common
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law’’) do not translate easily from one system to the other.
Governance is a matter of finding collective solutions to
problems that involve multiple actors and that are too complex to
be solved by individuals, like-minded groups of individuals, or
non-state actors (e.g. corporations). The study of governance
centers on identifying the processes that societies develop and use
to tackle such problems (e.g. securing public safety, encouraging
economic growth, combating air pollution); analyzing the condi-
tions that determine whether these processes produce successes or
failures in addressing specific problems, and exploring options for
improving the performance of governance processes.
We focus on environmental problems and the governance
processes that China and the United States have developed to
address these problems. Though both societies have long traditions
of dealing with the management of natural resources and
responding promptly to natural disasters, the emergence of the
environment as a distinct policy domain is a relatively recent
development in both countries, dating from the passage of the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 in the US and
from the 1979 preliminary version of the basic Environmental Law
in China. Today, environmental problems have become matters of
considerable importance and even urgency in both countries. We
endeavor to use our analysis of environmental governance in the
two countries to provide a broader assessment of the usefulness of
the concept of institutionalized governance processes in compar-
ing efforts to address a variety of problems arising in distinct
sociopolitical settings.
Environmental problems occur in every era and in all societies.
But the scale of the problems arising today is unprecedented. China
and the US are the two essential countries when it comes to
addressing the most profound environmental problems of our
times. In the case of climate change, for example, the two countries
account for over 40% of current emissions of carbon dioxide (Global
Carbon Project, 2014). No effort to solve the problem of climate
change can succeed without the active engagement of these
countries. Vigorous leadership on the part of America and China
might well prove sufficient to generate the momentum needed to
make the changes required to solve this problem. This makes the
November 2014 agreement between Presidents Obama and Xi on
measures to curtail greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions a particularly
important step in the realm of environmental governance.
While all societies must find ways to tackle environmental
problems, there is no reason to suppose that the resultant
processes will be the same or even similar from one society to
another (Steinberg and VanDeveer, 2012; Duit, 2014). On the
contrary, we expect distinct processes to develop in individual
societies that dominate efforts to identify/frame environmental
problems, establish their priority in policy arenas, and determine
the nature of the steps taken to solve them (Ostrom, 2005). Our
central hypothesis is that the dominant processes that China and
the US have developed to address environmental problems differ in
fundamental ways. These processes are institutionalized in the
sense that they are rooted in and reflect longstanding political,
legal, organizational, and cultural characteristics of the two
societies. Understanding these differences can facilitate efforts
to achieve comparable levels of effort, thereby providing a basis for
strengthening measures designed to address transboundary and
global problems.
In today’s globalized world, both policymakers and analysts
sometimes find it expedient to use similar terminology in
comparing governance processes operating in different countries
and in evaluating their results. This practice often leads to
confusion rather than to clarity regarding the defining features
and the performance of governance systems in specific countries.
Nowhere is this complication more apparent than in the case ofthe processes of environmental governance in China and the US.
We therefore make a concerted effort to use key terms precisely
or to introduce new terms where this is necessary to avoid
confusion.
2. The challenge of environmental governance
Environmental governance and governance in other issue
domains (e.g. national security, macroeconomics, or health,
education, and welfare) belong to the same broad universe of
cases. Yet environmental problems and the processes societies
develop to address them have several distinctive characteristics
that have important implications for thinking about the perfor-
mance of environmental governance systems.
Solving environmental problems typically requires an effort to
modify, redirect, or even suppress conduct on the part of actors
ranging from individuals to powerful (private or state-owned)
enterprises whose actions reflect interests that are entrenched and
that are deemed socially desirable in many contexts. Think of
competition among enterprises for market share in a properly
functioning market system as a case in point.
Within governments, moreover, environment ministries/agen-
cies routinely have mandates that bump up against or conflict with
the efforts of other agencies to pursue missions aimed at
maximizing economic growth, delivering health care, constructing
transportation systems, and so forth. If, as is often the case,
environment ministries are weak relative to other ministries in
political terms, the challenge of altering the conduct of (private and
public) actors who can count on the support of stronger
government agencies becomes particularly daunting.
3. Institutionalized processes of environmental governance
In seeking to identify distinctive governance processes, we
recognize that a good deal of variation exists within each system so
that simple generalizations are hazardous. Yet it is possible to
identify dominant processes that evolve over time, are embedded
in broader social systems, and are brought to bear repeatedly in
efforts to address specific environmental problems. Our discussion
of institutionalized governance processes constitutes an initial
formulation; it is intended to encourage further study and
comparison. Nevertheless, we are convinced that there are
institutionalized environmental governance processes in place
in China and the US and that these processes differ profoundly.
We argue that each system features three institutionalized
processes, two dominant processes involving government as the
central force and a third less developed process in which shifting
perceptions, attitudes, and values on the part of the public (or
within civil society) are central. In the two dominant processes,
actions on the part of governmental entities (including the courts
in the case of the US and the communist party in the case of China)
play the central role in solving environmental problems. In the
third process, actions occurring outside of governments are
central, either in the form of the diffusion of new social norms
(e.g. the growing acceptance of same-sex couples in America) or in
the form of coordinated behavior on the part of sizable groups of
people (e.g. the gentrification of urban cores in many cities, the rise
and fall in the popularity of sport utility vehicles). Although such
third processes have played some role regarding environmental
issues in both societies, we argue that they are (currently)
subordinate to the dominant processes in the two countries and
that they are generally regarded as less important in addressing
environmental problems than they are in addressing problems
arising in other issue domains (e.g. civil and human rights).
The dominant processes of environmental governance in China,
we argue, take the form of (i) many laws but state planning in
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scanning procedures and policy responses on an irregular or
episodic basis outside the confines of the Five-Year Plans (FYPs) or
other national plans.
The parallel processes in the US involve (i) law-centered
practices including the enactment of legislation, the promulgation
of regulations, and the judgments of courts regarding controversies
about the application of these measures in specific situations and
(ii) federalism/multi-level governance featuring initiatives/inno-
vations at national and sub-national levels of government and
policy diffusion.
4. Dominant Chinese environmental governance processes
4.1. Many laws but state planning is dominant
China is a unitary or centralized state, with formal authority
residing at the top. The country has millennia of experience with
the efforts of central governments to manage a vast area
characterized by considerable geographic and cultural diversity.
In reality, relations between the central government and local
governments in China are far more complex than the concept of a
unitary state might suggest. Central design may be followed by
local implementation including creative competition, but also by
local resistance whether in the form of seeming defiance of the
center or invidious competition among local governments. Still,
the central government plays the leading role in efforts to solve
environmental problems.
The central government – a combination of the main organs of
the ruling party, the State Council, and the National People’s
Congress - is responsible for articulating policies and developing
nationwide plans. Adopted on a trial basis in 1979 and formalized in
1989, the Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of
China articulates a general commitment to maintaining environ-
mental quality and calls for the development of standards,
procedures dealing with environmental impact assessment, moni-
toring systems, and penalties for violations (Environmental Protec-
tion Law, 1989). Since then, China has enacted numerous
environmental laws addressing specific environmental issues as
well as a variety of environment-related laws. Nevertheless, when it
comes to devising substantive measures addressing environmental
problems and especially dealing with matters of implementation,
state planning plays the dominant role in environmental governance
in China.
At the center of this planning process are the nationwide FYPs
that set forth overall goals, establish priorities in cases where
tradeoffs among goals are necessary, and spell out more specific
targets (mu biao) on a synoptic but time-limited basis. The five-
year cycle of each FYP begins with the release of the national Five-
Year Plan for Social and Economic Development at the annual joint
meeting of the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s
Political Consultative Conference in March of the first year of the
plan period. The key targets articulated in the FYP increasingly
include mandatory environmental and energy targets, such as
pollutant [sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NOX), chemical
oxygen demand (COD)] reduction targets, non-fossil energy
targets, and energy and carbon intensity reduction targets
(Xinhuanet, 2011). The central government assigns implementa-
tion of the targets to lower levels of government through
agreements (zeren shu) including performance measures. The
plans address the allocation of resources among targets, assign
responsibility for meeting the targets to lower levels of govern-
ment, introduce innovations in procedures used to promote
effective implementation, and provide criteria for evaluating the
performance of governance (Qi, 2014; Yan, 2013; Schreifels et al.,
2012; Guttman and Song, 2007). While they do not take the form oflaws in the western sense, the State Committee and the National
People’s Congress adopt the plans formally, endowing them the
authority of formal actions of China’s political institutions.
Following release of the overall Five-Year Plan for Social and
Economic Development by the central government, individual
ministries and local governments develop more focused FYPs on
the specific governance areas under their purview, such as the
Ministry of Environmental Protection’s (MEP) 12th Five-Year Plan
on Environmental Protection released in November 2011 (State
Council, 2011) and the National Development and Reform
Commission’s (NDRC) 12th Five-Year Plan on Energy Development
released in January 2013 (State Council, 2013).
Planning in China is a complex process involving many players
and resulting in the adoption of FYPs supplemented as needed by
national plans dealing with specific problems (e.g. PM 2.5) and a
variety of local plans addressing more limited issues (Song and
Guttman, 2007). The NDRC, generally regarded as the most
powerful civilian agency in the central government, plays a key
role in assembling and drafting the FYPs, which are then vetted by
the State Council and adopted formally by the National People’s
Congress as ‘‘legally binding’’ or ‘‘effective’’ acts of government (fa
lu xiao li). Because the FYPs are based on guidelines provided by the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), they
also reflect the views of the leadership of the CPC. As a result, they
have the support of the dominant political institutions in Chinese
society.
The goals, targets, and formulas for resource allocation
embedded in the FYPs may reflect the personal views of powerful
leaders, the preferences of major interest groups, influential
theories about economic development, assessments of what is
needed to maintain the stability of the system, the ideas of
prominent scientists, responses to rising public pressures, and so
forth. But whatever the origins of provisions of the FYPs, these
plans have the support of the leaders of both the party and the
formal institutions of government.
Moving the plans from paper to practice is challenging even in a
unitary state (Qi and Wu, 2013). The central government, which is
relatively small as measured by the size of the civil service (Guttman
et al., 2013) proceeds to set targets for provincial governments,
which in turn set targets for lower level governments. The Target
Responsibility System has evolved to exert pressure on lower-level
officials to make a concerted effort to fulfill the goals of the central
plans (Li et al., 2013). Along with other similar innovations, this has
improved performance. But like implementation in all political
systems, a variety of competing forces including personal ambition
and the effects of corruption can impede or even block progress
toward meeting the targets set by the plans.
The plans also provide a basis for a variety of mechanisms
designed to energize implementation efforts. Thus, the plans (i) set
forth targets in operational terms (e.g. a 20% reduction in energy
intensity) to serve as benchmarks for assessing progress, (ii)
rationalize the allocation of resources (e.g. subsidies) to those
charged with meeting the targets, (iii) lead to the development of
performance agreements to enhance the incentives of officials at
various levels, (iv) provide a basis for organizing pilot projects, and
(v) often become a focus of continued leadership attention.
In China, as in the US, there are legal procedures for resolving
conflicts between laws. China’s Law on Laws (li fa fa) provides for
reconciliation of conflicts by the State Council or the National
People’s Congress in contrast to the American practice of relying on
the judgments of courts. But ‘‘plans’’ are not defined as ‘‘laws’’ in
the Law on Laws, though the FYPs and other major plans are
adopted by the National People’s Congress and are therefore
backed by the authority of the government. In principle, a plan
must be consistent with the laws. In implementation, however,
inconsistency and even conflict are not uncommon, reflecting the
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those responsible for implementing the provisions of the plans and
meeting specific targets. As Deng Xiaoping argued in a 1978 speech
that remains well-known today: ‘‘[v]ery often, what leaders say is
taken as the law and anyone who disagrees is called a law-breaker’’
(Deng, 1978).
In China, plans (or other central government directives) are
enabled by the unitary system, which embraces not only
nationwide government but also nationwide public personnel
procedures. Plans and their targets may serve as criteria for
assessing the achievements of individual office holders. Targets set
in central plans are both to be followed by local governments and
used in periodic performance reviews that lead to promotion
decisions. Plans are typically time limited (e.g., operating for three
or five years or perhaps longer) and roughly correspond to
leadership tenures (at the highest level, now two five year terms).
Incoming leaders often play key roles in framing the terms of the
FYP they will inherit upon assuming office.
In form and in relation to what we treat as a defining
characteristic of environmental governance in China, planning
integrates environmental concerns with other, potentially com-
peting, priorities. The FYPs include numerous targets, with
environmental goals increasingly joining economic goals as ‘‘veto
targets’’ or targets that must be met by those seeking promotion. In
the process of drafting the plan, the NDRC consults with other
agencies and other levels of government. In the economic growth
vs. environmental quality context, ‘‘win/win’’ is a persistent
planning theme (e.g. support of the renewable energy industry).
This gives rise to the synoptic Chinese planning process in contrast
to the more piecemeal American lawmaking process where
environmental laws typically do not address economic develop-
ment directly (though of course they often have indirect economic
effects).
To illustrate concretely the process of state planning in China,
consider the case of efforts to reduce emissions of SO2. Both the
10th FYP (2001–2005) and the 11th FYP (2006–2010) set targets
for reductions in SO2 emissions. But the results were strikingly
different. Emissions in 2005 were 28% above 2000 levels. By
contrast, emissions in 2010 were 14% below 2005 levels. What
accounts for this striking turnaround in the results of state
planning from one planning period to the next? There is no simple
answer to this question. But analysts have identified a number of
key factors underlying success in the later period, including
stronger leadership support; better coordination between the
NDRC and the MEP; a focus on a smaller number of environmental
goals; innovation regarding policy instruments; improved proce-
dures for monitoring, reporting, and verification, and better
enforcement (Schreifels et al., 2012). An interesting debate centers
on the extent to which the turnaround between the 10th and 11th
FYPs constitutes evidence of the strengths of the planning process
or is simply attributable to ad hoc considerations (e.g. a focus on
‘‘low hanging fruit’’ within the capacity of existing technology
whose adoption could be financed and overseen by government
resources). The resolution of this debate has important implica-
tions for efforts to meet the ambitious targets for reductions in PM
2.5 articulated in the September 2013 Air Pollution Prevention and
Control Action Plan conceived in response to air pollution crises in
Beijing and other cities as well as for the goal announced in the
November 2014 China-US Climate Agreement of reaching peak
emissions of carbon dioxide around 2030.
4.2. Crisis scanning and policy responses beyond regular central plans
Many have noted that the success of governments in China
over millennia has depended on their capacity to prepare for and
deal with unpredictable but recurrent natural crises – floods,earthquakes, famines – as well as with analogous social or
political crises from within and without. What makes for success
in this process is an ability to identify disruptive events in a
timely manner and to devise direct responses to them that ease
the tension and allow the system to remain resilient.
Crises are partially subjective. Some natural disasters are
treated as relatively routine events that do not require exceptional
responses on the part of the government. But when an occurrence
(e.g. the 2007 algal bloom in Lake Tai or the drying up of the Yellow
River in the 1990s) is widely reported as a shocking event, it can
quickly take on crisis proportions. Governments may even
encourage such interpretations as a means of legitimizing strong
policy measures. With regard to the environment, China faces
continued challenges on many fronts. These include events with
immediate impact, such as oil or chemical spills that cause fish
deaths or crop failure and necessitate the use of bottled water.
They also include developments, such as local noise pollution
(from construction or traffic or street life) that may not amount to
crises in the ordinary sense, but are continued sources of
vociferous citizen complaints. In addition, these challenges include
threats, such as soil deterioration, deforestation, and limits on
water availability, that may be beyond the daily awareness of most
urban citizens but pose severe longer term threats. They also
include developments that pose long term and latent risks but that,
with social media and increased environmental awareness, may
present themselves as immediate causes of alarm. Current
examples include PM 2.5 air pollution, a chronic problem
punctuated by severe pollution episodes. The PM 2.5 problem
now affects citizens’ daily conduct as well as the development of
proposals for the construction of chemical or waste treatment
plants, which have become a source of local protests.
Such events occur in America as well. But from the point of view
of environmental governance, these events and the processes
involved in responding to them play a distinctive role in China. In
China, the government is understood to be the primary and default
institution with responsibility for both anticipating (scanning the
environment for) crises and responding to them. In the US, the
understanding is that this role is shared among the Federal
government, subnational governments, markets (including the
insurance industry), and civil society. There is an assumption that
civil society (sometimes referred to as the ‘‘voluntary’’ or ‘‘third’’
sector) plays a watchdog role in anticipating crises and devising
means to address them as well as a mediating role in addressing
them. In China today, the concept of a campaign (yundong) is also
in use but most often in association with efforts by leaders to focus
the attention of lower level government officials and citizens on a
problem.
In the US, the initiation of a law process is typically the primary
form of crisis response. Thus, US environmental disasters (e.g. the
burning of the Cuyahoga River, the discovery of hazardous wastes
in the Love Canal, or the gas leak at Union Carbide’s plant in Bhopal)
are recalled in significant part because of their association with the
enactment of laws to address them and prevent the recurrence of
similar environmental problems.
China has developed a repertoire of tools and practices to deal
with such problems during the intervals between the development
of one FYP and the next (Zhou et al., 2013; Zhang and Barr, 2013).
One common practice is to compensate victims of crises for their
personal losses without altering broader priorities articulated in
the FYPs. Other measures include the development of more
focused plans (e.g. the Overall Plan on Comprehensive Manage-
ment of Water Environment in the Lake Tai Watershed developed
in the wake of the 2007 crisis; the 2013 Air Pollution Prevention
and Control Action Plan) or the launching of experiments with new
policy instruments (e.g. the regulations designed to reduce traffic
congestion in Beijing). In some cases, the government has
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certain resources (Greenhalgh, 2008). A recent example is the
adoption of a national cap on the consumption of coal as a response
to the crisis of air pollution in major cities (symbolized by public
concern about PM 2.5) which will expand upon existing caps on
coal consumption in key air pollution regions and provinces such
as the Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei area, the Yangtze River Delta area
around Shanghai, and the Pearl River Delta in the industrialized
southern part of Guangdong Province.
What all these practices have in common is that they are ad hoc
responses on the part of the government to irregular crises that
flair into matters of intense public concern and that are judged to
require immediate attention. Prompt responses are required in
cases like the 2007 algal bloom in Lake Tai, the 2008 Sichuan
earthquake, the great ice storm of 2008, and the 2011 oil spill in
Bohai Bay. An ability to address such incidents successfully is
essential to the effectiveness of governance in China, even though
the solutions found are often not suitable for inclusion in the
regular FYPs.
As a concrete example of the second dominant Chinese process,
consider the PM 2.5 crisis. In 2008, in the run-up to the Beijing
Olympics, domestic and international press frequently published
articles about the potential impact of air quality on the Olympics,
and the US Embassy in Beijing introduced a system for monitoring
and publicizing levels of fine particulates in the air known as PM
2.5. Circulated initially among staff members of the Embassy, these
data were later published on social media. The public began to
question the discrepancies between the US Embassy’s qualitative
characterization of ambient PM 2.5 levels (e.g. ‘‘hazardous’’) and
Beijing’s qualitative description of air quality (e.g., ‘‘blue sky’’).
Since then, public concern about the health effects of air pollution
in major Chinese cities has risen exponentially. In January and
February 2013, the Air Quality Index in a number of cities in
northern China, including Beijing, reached extreme and unprec-
edented levels. Public reaction to the expected health impacts of
PM 2.5 erupted into a problem of crisis proportions. In an effort to
respond to this crisis, the State Council commissioned the MEP to
take the lead in drafting an Air Pollution Prevention and Control
Action Plan (MEP, 2013). Released by the State Council in
September 2013, the plan sets concrete PM 2.5 and PM
10 reduction targets for 2017 for key air pollution regions and
the rest of China, respectively; targets a variety of pollution
sources, including coal-fired power plants and industrial boilers,
vehicles, and construction activities; promotes rebalancing of
China’s industrial and energy structure, and urges strengthening of
mechanisms such as pollution monitoring and disclosure, enforce-
ment of laws, and regional air pollution coordination. This
initiative constitutes a prominent example of China’s crisis
response governance process. But it remains to be seen whether
this plan developed quickly in response to a severe crisis and not
backed by the full authority of the FYP can change the behavior of
local officials and enterprises who previously allowed air pollution
to grow unchecked and whether efforts to address the PM 205
problem will be integrated into the next FYP.
5. Dominant American environmental governance processes
5.1. Law-centered practices involving legislation, regulation, and
judicial judgments
In the US, law-related activities are central to the treatment of
environmental problems. If a problem arises, the first question is:
‘‘Is there a law?’’ If there is a law: ‘‘How well does it work?’’ If it
does not work well: ‘‘Can we fix it or pass a new law?’’ Law-
centered processes have several variants involving the enactment
of legislation, the use of the executive’s regulatory authority, andthe judgments of courts. Such processes may be initiated from
within government. But they may also arise from outside the
government through the initiatives of citizens (or NGOs or
enterprises) (Fiorino, 1995).
In the American common law tradition, citizens have used
centuries old concepts to seek court relief from problems that have
yet to be addressed by legislation or regulations. The common law
concept of tort, including nuisance (itself borrowed from Roman
law), was critical to the early development of American environ-
mental law and environmental governance. Another example
centers on what is known as the public trust doctrine under which
courts have ruled that government agencies have an inalienable
responsibility to protect water bodies, such as lakes and rivers, and
coastal resources, such as shellfish beds and wetlands (Sax, 1970;
McCay, 1998).
Beginning with the enactment of NEPA in 1969, and continuing
with clean air and water laws, the Superfund legislation addressing
hazardous waste sites, and laws dealing with toxic releases,
legislation became the core of the modern American environmen-
tal governance process (Mazmanian and Kraft, 2009). The
implementation of this legislation involves specialized agencies,
such as the Environmental Protection Agency, the Forest Service,
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the
Department of Energy as well as state-level counterparts, which
promulgate regulations designed to move the provisions of laws
from paper to practice and take action as needed to enforce the
regulations. The US Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 and state
counterparts set forth the procedures agencies must follow in
developing implementing regulations, including provisions for
public participation in the development of the regulations as well
as the right of citizens and organizations to go to court to challenge
agency fidelity to the legislation (Percival et al., 2009). Although
these laws were not immediately effective in solving environmen-
tal problems, they have provided points of departure to be
strengthened progressively through formal amendments and
innovative practices at the administrative level.
To help enforce US laws, the Department of Justice started to
upgrade the enforcement capabilities of its Lands and Natural
Resources Division (now called the Environment and Natural
Resources Division) in the 1970s, adding several new sections
including one on hazardous waste enforcement and another on
wildlife enforcement. During the same period, ‘‘citizen suit’’
provisions were added to most environmental laws under which
citizens can go to court to sue polluters directly when the
government fails to act. The citizen suit provision is important as a
means both of complementing government resources and of
enhancing the prospect of compliance and law enforcement where,
for whatever reason, government agencies are not willing to act
against polluters who are violating the law.
This law-centered process differs from the state planning
process in China in several important respects. Whereas China’s
FYPs are synoptic, American laws address environmental problems
on their own terms without endeavoring to integrate measures
with policies in other issue domains (e.g. industrial policy). On the
other hand, whereas China’s FYPs are time-limited (each FYP will
be superseded by a new plan at the end of five years), American
laws are intended to remain in force indefinitely. State planning of
the type practiced in China is politically infeasible in the United
States. This means that efforts to address environmental problems
like air pollution or water pollution must proceed on a self-
contained basis. There is no mechanism for establishing priorities
across the broader policy agenda or addressing tradeoffs among
goals in a given time period.
Administrations change in the US, and those responsible for
specific problems can hope that a new administration will take
office that is less interested in enforcing existing laws. But laws
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seek to weaken them. Of course, there is also the prospect that a later
administration will seek to strengthen laws or decide to increase the
attention devoted to implementing existing laws. Administrative
agencies (e.g. EPA) will continue to make an effort to implement
laws, even when they are not matters of priority to top-level
policymakers. And actors in civil society can bring suits in courts,
regardless of the preferences of an incumbent administration.
The effectiveness of law-centered processes in solving environ-
mental problems depends on the ability of Congress to enact
legislation, the stringency of legislation that Congress enacts, the
capacity of government agencies to implement the provisions of
legislation, the willingness of Congress to provide adequate
funding, and the willingness of the courts to make rulings in
cases of controversy that are favorable to the cause of environ-
mental protection. As experience with legislation enacted in the
1970s, subsequent amendments, and regulatory actions makes
clear, this process can produce striking successes in addressing
environmental problems. Since enactment of the Clean Air Act, for
example, emissions of key criteria pollutants have declined more
the 70%, while the American economy has experienced consider-
able growth.
But there is no guarantee that the American law-centered
process of environmental governance will prove effective. When
political polarization leads to congressional gridlock or the judges
appointed to the federal courts (especially the federal appeals
courts and the Supreme Court) become less friendly to environ-
mental causes, the results may be far less satisfactory from the
perspective of environmental problem solving.
A striking example of the operation of this governance process
centers on the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (Bryner, 1995).
One of the hardest fought environmental battles of the 1980s in the
US dealt with the impacts of acid rain on human health, freshwater
lakes, forests, and even the built environment. The battle pitted the
Northeast against the Midwest and coal producers against
residents of impacted areas. Scientific consensus regarding the
effects of acid rain was elusive. But political pressure to take action
mounted steadily. In November 1990, President Bush signed the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, which the House of
Representatives had passed by a vote of 401-21 and the Senate
by a vote of 89-11. The legislation called for a 50% reduction in
emissions of SO2, the principal precursor of acid rain, and
introduced an innovative cap-and-trade system to achieve this
goal. Focusing on the power sector, the 1990 amendments require
this sector as a whole to maintain emissions below a mass-based
limit that does not adjust for growth in output. Each coal-fired
power plant must have a continuous monitoring system that meets
EPA’s performance specifications to account for every ton of SO2
emitted. This case is regarded widely as one of America’s most
successful environmental initiatives. But the generalizability of
this experience to other environmental issues is far from clear.
5.2. Federalism/multi-level governance
Whereas China has a unitary state, the United States has a
federal political system. Under the terms of the American
Constitution, all powers not assigned to the Federal government
remain with the states (US Constitution, 10th Amendment, 1791).
And under state constitutions, local governments retain authority
over functions like public order, education, and land use planning
and zoning.
Reality is more complex than this simple statement implies.
Just as the ability of the central government to control what
happens in the provinces is a longstanding issue in China, relations
among levels of government is an enduring theme of American
political history. In the 20th century, both authority and resourcesgenerally flowed to the Federal government. Spurred by the
influence of progressivism, the need to fight large-scale wars, and
the crisis of the Great Depression, the Federal government became
a dominant force in governance in America. Starting in the 1980s,
however, Republican administrations have pushed the pendulum
back in the other direction, a development now promoted by the
Tea Party and various libertarian groups.
Yet this is not the whole story. There is considerable variation
among state and local governments. Many of them have developed
distinctive approaches to a variety of issues, including the
treatment of environmental problems. This situation emerges as
a particularly important feature of American politics during
periods like the present in which the Federal government is
hobbled by the effects of polarization, despite the emergence of
increasingly severe problems (Rabe, 2004).
With regard to environmental governance, an important theme
has been whether leaving states to their own devices will lead to a
‘‘race to the top’’ or a ‘‘race to the bottom.’’ Will states compete for
economic development by strengthening environmental laws or
by watering them down or avoiding them altogether? In the early
20th century, reformers talked about states as ‘‘laboratories of
democracy’’ and promoted the idea that innovations tried out in
individual states could, upon success, be emulated at the national
level. When mid-20th century environmentalism emerged in the
1960s, it was during the height of the civil rights movement in
which Washington was called on to address state and local refusals
to honor basic rights. The key environmental laws of the late 20th
century were federal laws. States were given implementation
roles, but subject to strict federal oversight augmented by the
efforts of public interest advocacy groups acting as watchdogs. In
recent years, the state/federal balance has been changing again. In
the context of leadership roles assumed by California and other
states along with cities like Portland, Oregon and faced with
congressional resistance to climate change legislation, the pendu-
lum has swung to a view that state and local action may be
increasingly important (Schreurs, 2008; Barber, 2013).
The interplay among levels of government in the US is
illustrated nicely in the story of efforts to curb emissions from
electric power stations. In 2007, the Supreme Court handed down a
decision in a case known as Massachusetts v. EPA, initiated by a
group of states frustrated by the lack of federal action regarding the
problem of climate change, confirming that carbon dioxide (CO2) is
a pollutant under the terms of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990. Still, the Federal government did not take steps at the time to
address the problem of GHG emissions. Despite congressional
deadlock on the issue, the Obama Administration proposed
regulations under the Clean Air Act in 2014 that would reduce
CO2 emissions from existing coal-fired power stations, with an
anticipated outcome of reducing systemwide CO2 emissions by
30% relative to 2005 levels by 2030. All states with such power
stations will be subject to the provisions of this regulatory
initiative. The proposed regulations would build on actions already
underway in many states (e.g. renewable portfolio standards,
energy efficiency programs, CO2 emission cap and trade programs)
and in the power sector, leaving it to individual states to make their
own choices regarding policy instruments to be used within their
jurisdictions. A vigorous debate is underway regarding plans to
finalize these proposed regulations in 2015. If this process does go
forward, it will set up a test of the effectiveness of executive
authority with consequences that will extend far beyond the case
of climate change.
6. The performance of environmental governance systems
This focus on institutionalized governance processes that are
deeply rooted in the historical experiences and in the social and
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understand successes and failures of environmental governance in
China and the US but also to identify opportunities for improve-
ment and to devise strategies that make it possible to capitalize on
these opportunities in specific issues areas.
6.1. Successes and failures
Both successes and failures in efforts to solve environmental
problems occur in each system (Meadowcroft, 2014). It is
important to recognize differences between the two societies in
assessing the performance of their environmental governance
systems. America is a post-industrial society moving away from
heavy industry; China is still in the stage of rapid industrialization,
although it is already beginning to shift its economy toward
higher-value manufacturing and services. Nevertheless, it is not
hard to identify successes and failures in each setting.
In some cases, the two countries have coordinated their efforts
to pursue common environmental goals. The successful effort to
phase out many ozone-depleting substances is an important case
in point. During their June 2013 meeting, Presidents Obama and Xi
pledged to work together to phase down production and
consumption of hydrofluourocarbons (HFCs), which are powerful
climate pollutants being used as substitutes for ozone-depleting
substances. Equally striking is the agreement announced during
President Obama’s visit to China in November 2014 that the two
countries will coordinate their efforts to deal with GHG emissions
and work toward a successful conclusion of a new global
agreement at the UNFCCC’s COP 21 in Paris at the end of 2015.
In the US, there have been major successes in providing safe
drinking water, removing lead from gasoline, improving food
safety, reducing emissions of a range of air pollutants including SO2
and NOX, reducing black carbon and particulate pollution as well as
urban smog, and cleaning up many hazardous waste sites. At the
same time, serious problems remain regarding the impacts of
agricultural fertilizers and pesticides, the occurrence of algal
blooms in large lakes, the spread of dead zones in marine systems,
the mining of fossil groundwater, and high per capita emissions of
GHGs.
China has achieved successes in reducing SO2 emissions and
COD, ensuring that some of the water flowing in the Yellow River
reaches the sea (Wang, 2005), taking steps to improve food
security, and reducing energy intensity. On the other hand, rapid
industrialization and urbanization have caused serious environ-
mental problems. Air, water, and soil quality remain severe
problems, and water shortages are a major problem in some parts
of the country. Analysis suggests that air pollution, especially
particulate pollution from coal combustion and solid fuel-fired
heating, is the fourth leading cause of premature mortality and
morbidity in China, resulting in 1.2 million premature deaths in
2010 (Yang, 2013). Despite reductions in energy intensity, total
emissions of GHGs have risen rapidly. China now accounts for
27–28% of global carbon dioxide emissions, a proportion that
continues to rise (Global Carbon Project, 2014).
6.2. Determinants of effectiveness
What factors determine the extent to which the processes of
environmental problem solving prevalent in the two countries
succeed or fail? Of course, more research is needed to answer this
question. But some initial observations are in order.
Some determinants of effectiveness are common to America
and China, though they play out differently in the two systems.
Leadership is an important factor in both systems. In America, this
may mean the ability to form coalitions needed to produce results
in legislative settings. In China, it is more likely to mean the abilityof key individuals (e.g. the president and premier) to set priorities
and line up support within the top ranks of the party and relevant
interest groups. Implementation–moving plans or laws from paper
to practice - is another key factor in both systems. Lower level
officials have their own incentives that may further or thwart
efforts to implement environmental policies, despite the introduc-
tion of procedures (e.g. the Target Responsibility System in China)
designed to improve implementation. Corruption is a threat to
implementation in both systems. In addition, there are challenges
of tracking progress in both systems, so that it is possible to
determine when and whether policy initiatives are working.
Innovations regarding reliable systems of monitoring and verifi-
cation are important in both settings.
On the other hand, given the differences between the two
systems regarding dominant governance processes, other deter-
minants of effectiveness are specific to one system or the other. In
the US, the composition of the judiciary has always been important
to the law-centered processes. Today, the polarization that
paralyzes federal, and often state, legislative action is also key
to the workings of the law-centered processes (Klyza and Sousa,
2008). In China, the assumption that the stability of the existing
political order depends on its ability to deliver continued economic
growth can act as a barrier to progress regarding environmental
issues, although rising popular pressure to address environmental
problems appears to be having an impact on public policy (Shapiro,
2012).
6.3. Societal roots and path dependence
The processes we have described are deeply rooted in the
political and legal institutions and in the cultures and historical
experiences of the two societies. This makes environmental
governance in the US and China highly path dependent. A key
question, therefore, is whether continued adherence to these paths
will allow for solutions to the environmental problems likely to
arise in the coming years and decades.
The idea of the centrality of law, inherited from English
common law, is deeply rooted in American culture. The role of
interest group politics is embedded in the political philosophy of
pluralism and in the system of checks and balances established
in the US Constitution, which makes legislative bargaining
necessary to produce policy innovation under most circum-
stances. Federalism in America prohibits the direct use of
Chinese-style pilot projects, although the Federal government
may seek to achieve similar results by offering incentives for
local experiments.
Today, many Americans routinely question, from a variety of
perspectives, the adequacy of the law-centered processes we have
identified to meet emerging challenges. There is a common view
that the political institutions that are the focus of the law-centered
processes, particularly at the federal level, are not working well.
In commentaries on China’s rise and America’s gridlock, it is not
uncommon to hear prominent observers comparing America’s
government and market system unfavorably to China’s state
planning process. Since President Carter, no American president
has called for a national plan with regard to energy or the
environment; no Congress has taken such ideas seriously. Today,
the Obama Administration is seeking to use existing legal authority
under the Clean Air Act to take action regarding climate change in
the face of opposition from some members of Congress and
powerful private interests. Whether EPA regulation within the
existing provisions of the Clean Air Act can or will be adequate, and
if so, sustained in court, remains to be seen. Similarly, while there is
enthusiasm for continued experimentation in states and cities,
there are deep questions about the feasibility of scaling up state
and local actions to address climate change challenges.
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For millennia, China’s central governments have sought to develop
and refine means to deal with environmental problems and other
governance concerns. Using modern technologies and economic
instruments, the central government today is able to enunciate
policies in terms of FYPs (and further policy directives) that apply
in principle on a systemwide basis. But it remains to be seen
whether the core processes we have identified will be capable of
solving the environmental problems arising today and in the near
future.
As in the US, powerful economic interests continue to oppose
restrictions imposed in the name of the environment. Moreover,
given the number and complexity of environmental challenges, it
is difficult to establish priorities among them and to operationalize
these priorities in a useful manner. The 10th FYP may have lost
traction by adopting a multiplicity of environmental targets; the
11th FYP may have succeeded because it focused more narrowly on
a few (e.g. SO2 and COD) (Schreifels et al., 2012).
A comparison with the American system of environmental
governance suggests several questions. China now has many
environmental laws. But in moving from the letter of the law to
practice, where will law(s) fit into the plan(s) and other rule sets
employed by the Chinese government (He et al., 2013)? Will the
planning process, with its temporal qualities rooted in the Chinese
party and personnel systems, be able to address the complexities of
the environmental challenges arising in China today? How will the
resources that nongovernmental actors might bring to bear on
identifying environmental challenges and assisting government in
implementing policies be harnessed?
7. Extensions and corollaries
Our central argument regarding the role of institutionalized
governance processes is complete. But in this final substantive
section, we extend our analysis to what we described in an early
section of this article as third governance processes and to the
identification of a corollary to our argument relating to what
analysts commonly describe as policy instruments.
7.1. Third governance processes
In the US, nongovernmental actors play important roles in
bringing issues to public attention, in catalyzing legislative or
regulatory responses, in exploring the advantages and disadvan-
tages of various policy instruments, and in oversight of their
implementation including through the actions of courts. In China,
citizen protests may trigger governmental concern and response,
but the mechanisms for public participation are not as well
developed, at least at this stage. Still, the role of government
remains key to all these processes in both China and the US.
What are the prospects for the rise of alternative governance
processes in which non-governmental forces play a more central
role? Is there a common need for third processes? At issue here is
whether there is a role for governance processes in America and
China in which governments or public agencies are either not
involved at all or play subordinate roles, acknowledging and
perhaps ratifying solutions that emerge from nongovernmental
processes. In America, for example, the anti-smoking movement
brought about profound changes in both norms and behavior
independent of legislative or judicial action. Are such processes
significant in finding solutions to environmental problems? Are
they specific to the American cultural setting?
One example of a third process involves the history and
continued possibility of self-regulation on the part of nongovern-
mental actors. For example, the private insurance industry (in the
US and elsewhere) has played a role in driving a concern forindustrial safety by identifying future risks that enterprises might
be liable for, and conditioning insurance on a requirement that
enterprises take action to mitigate such risks. Government plays a
supporting role in insurance, of course, providing the backbone of
‘‘law’’ institutions, including courts to enforce contracts. But we
argue that such nongovernmental regulation differs from late 20th
century market-based regulation, such as cap-and-trade arrange-
ments, in which governments play a more central role in creating
the markets and setting market rules (Haufler, 1997; Delmas and
Young, 2009).
A second example highlights cultural or lifestyle changes,
perhaps related to education and the availability of information,
that are responsive to acute environmental realities. In China,
pollution levels now appear to be affecting basic life choices: what
city to locate in, where to raise children and send them to school,
where to buy food, and what kinds of economic development to
welcome into the neighborhood (Wong, 2013; Aitken, 2014).
Technological changes provide a third example. Renewable
energy technologies and altered industrial processes occupy
prominent places in economic development in the US and China.
In both countries, there has been a close connection between the
development of these technologies and efforts to address
environmental problems. Government interventions in the forms
of subsidies, taxes, or other incentives have played an important
role in both countries. But in some cases, at least, the drivers of
technological advances are nongovernmental actors. Greenpeace,
for example, pioneered refrigerators free of fluorinated gases that
deplete the ozone layer and contribute to climate change.
These third governance processes play some role in dealing
with environmental issues in both America and China. But we
argue that they are less important in addressing environmental
problems than they are in coming to terms with issues in other
domains.
In the US, the environmental movement has favored a strategy
of seeking to induce governments to make use of law-centered
approaches to deal with environmental problems. We do not (yet)
see environmental counterparts to the successes of the women’s
suffrage movement, the civil rights movement, or the gay rights
movement. A partial exception in America may be the animal
rights movement. But even this case illustrates the limited impact
of such third processes in addressing environmental problems. In
China, on the other hand, both the political culture and the current
political system are not conducive to the development of effective
social movements. While the government is sometimes responsive
to crises fueled by public concern over the effects of natural
disasters or the health implications of pollutants, officials work
hard to put barriers in the way of efforts to instigate effective social
movements to address societal concerns.
It may be as well that the nature of (some) environmental issues
makes them difficult to address through non-governmental
processes. Some issues, such as climate change, are unrelated to
the day-to-day concerns of life, leave individuals without a sense of
personal efficacy, and are easily displaced by more immediate
concerns. In many cases, environmental issues involve the
production of public or collective goods, a fact that encourages
many (perhaps most) people to behave as free riders hoping that
others will take the steps needed to address the problem. As close
observers have noted, there are relatively few cases of significant
social movements that are inspired by international problems and
that transcend the boundaries of individual societies.
Could this situation change in the future? Despite the force of
path dependence, neither the Chinese nor the American political
system is immune to change. Especially in cases where transgres-
sing planetary boundaries may lead to dramatic crises in the future
(Rockstro¨m et al., 2009), the dominant governance processes may
become discredited, opening up opportunities for third processes
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an issue that could precipitate such changes in both countries
(Klein, 2014).
7.2. Policy instruments for environmental governance
Both countries employ a variety of policy instruments or tools
(e.g. taxes, subsidies, permits, command-and-control regulations)
in efforts to achieve the goals/targets set forth in laws and plans.
Many analyses of environmental governance focus on the details of
specific policy instruments on the assumption that the choice of
the right instrument is critical to the success of policy initiatives.
There is some logic to this argument. But in our view, policy
instruments are subordinate to institutionalized governance
processes. In most situations, more than one policy instrument
can do the job, and the choice of specific instruments is apt to be
dictated by the prevailing governance process rather than the
other way around.
If our argument about the central role of institutionalized
governance processes is correct, we would expect to find (i) some
policy instruments in the two systems that bear the same name but
work differently because of divergences in the underlying
governance processes and (ii) some tools that are important in
one system but have no clear analog in the other system. As a
Chinese saying puts it, changes often occur when ‘‘seeds from fruit
on one side of the river are transplanted on the other.’’
Consider the case of experiments and pilot projects as an
example of the first of these propositions. Chinese governance
processes often rely on the launching of pilot projects in selected
provinces and cities, learning from the results of these experi-
ments, and scaling up successful experiences (Schreurs, 2008). In
the late 20th century, centrally sanctioned local experimentation,
including the launching of ‘‘special economic zones’’ and
‘‘household production responsibility systems,’’ was key to the
remarkable ‘‘opening up and reform’’ strategy of economic
development (Heilmann, 2008; Shirk, 1993; Oi, 1999; Fewsmith,
2013). In the 21st century, pilot or experimental projects have been
features of the processes of environmental governance. In the first
decade of the century, experiments or pilots included ‘‘low carbon
development pilots’’ and emissions trading pilots. The focus of the
current 12th FYP on low carbon development has been accompa-
nied by experiments in low carbon urban development and
emissions trading (Zhu et al., 2014). While local governments may
be proactive in competing for designation as a pilot, the process is
ultimately under the control of the central government.
In the US, local pilots or experiments are also common. But the
practice differs from the parallel practice in China in several
important respects. In China, experimentation/learning and
scaling up are usually under the control of the central government.
Provinces and cities may compete to become pilots, but the central
government decides on the location of pilot projects, takes the lead
in evaluating the results, and makes decisions regarding which
initiatives are ready to be scaled up for broader application. In
America, state and local governments have the authority to make
their own choices in this realm. The Federal government may try to
guide this process through the use of subsidies or other incentives.
But the fact that state and local governments have the authority to
make their own decisions about such matters means that a variety
of ideas about ways to solve specific problems often surface in state
and local settings.
Whether or not these state and local initiatives spread to other
jurisdictions is a matter of policy diffusion rather than manage-
ment on the part of the Federal government. In some cases, the
influence of a particularly large state (e.g. California) is sufficient to
persuade other states or private enterprises to follow its lead. In
other cases (e.g. health care legislation), the Federal governmentmay decide to model national legislation on arrangements already
tried out at the state level. But there is no guarantee or even
expectation that these diffusion mechanisms will come into play.
Turning to our second point regarding policy instruments,
consider these examples. In China, government imposed caps are
applied to otherwise permissible or encouraged conduct on the part
of individuals, whereas parallel government imposition of limits on
individuals would be unacceptable in the US. These caps include the
one child policy most prominently (Greenhalgh, 2008), but also
ongoing limits on car ownership (and, though not immediately
related to the environment, on home ownership), and the newly
announced cap on coal consumption. In the case of limits on
enterprises, the idea of cap-and-trade is a hallmark of market-based
environmental regulation in the US. China also has been experi-
menting with emissions trading in its planned experimentation
process (Bachus and Cao, 2013). But it is by no means clear whether
caps on the activities of enterprises in the context of China’s planned
experimentation, where many prime polluters are state owned, have
the same practical meaning as market-based regulation in America.
The American system is law centric. Legislation passed by
Congress and signed by the President initiates an elaborate process
of formulating and promulgating regulations whose application
and adequacy are often contested in courts. While China has many
environmental laws, the state planning process is central and even
dominant when it comes to the allocation of resources and the
evaluation of performance. There are as well many other ‘‘rules’’ in
China that have no direct analogs in the US system. In addition to
laws (as designated in the li fa fa or Law on Laws) and plans, for
example, formal (i.e. written) leadership directives on which both
government officials and those outside of government may act
include red-headed documents (hong tou wen jian), documents
bearing a leader’s sign off (pishi orpizhun), and documents that
might be characterized in English as opinions/suggestions (jianyi).
8. What to look for in the future
Given the argument we have presented, there is no reason to
expect convergence in the environmental governance systems
operating in China and the US. Many accounts sow confusion in
this regard. This is the case regarding both what we have termed the
dominant governance processes in each country and the ways in
which policy instruments are brought to bear to achieve goals or
targets prioritized in the two systems. In China, for example, there are
systems of emissions permits intended to control water and air
pollution and pilots featuring tradable emissions permits for GHG
emissions, developments that suggest a move in the direction of
American initiatives intended to address problems of pollution
through the creation of quasi-markets (e.g. the US Acid Rain Program,
the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, and California’s GHG cap-
and-trade system). In our judgment, however, Chinese initiatives
involving emissions permits and similar innovations regarding policy
instruments differ in fundamental ways from parallel initiatives in
America, despite the use of similar terminology.
Developments during the fall of 2014 have brought the issues we
discuss in this article to the forefront of efforts to address high profile
environmental problems (e.g. climate change) in both countries.
In November 2014, Presidents Obama and Xi announced a Sino-
American agreement regarding emissions of GHGs. China plans to
reach peak emissions by around 2030. In related policy measures
(not yet adopted formally by the National People’s Congress), the
leadership has taken steps to impose a cap on coal consumption and
to pursue a target of achieving 20% of electricity production from
renewable sources by 2030. When the National People’s Congress
approves these measures, they will be treated as (legally) binding or
having ‘‘legal effect’’ (fa lu xiao li). Given China’s top-down approach
to implementation, these measures will be taken seriously. But
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capacity and pressures to achieve competing goals will be critical
determinants of their ultimate success. The Obama Administration,
for its part, has pledged to reduce GHG emissions by 26–28% relative
to 2005 levels by 2025. But there is little prospect that the US
Congress will enact legislation formalizing such a target in law. This
means that the administration will be forced to rely largely on
executive initiatives justified on the basis of existing statutory
authority as a means of pursuing this goal.
In China, these developments are unfolding in the context of the
results of the CPC’s October 2014 Fourth Plenum of the Eighteenth
Congress focusing on the rule of law. In a roadmap document
issued at the end of the plenum, the leadership announced a
commitment to the integration of ‘‘law’’ and ‘‘policy’’ (including
plans) (Communist Party of China, 2014). If this initiative is
pursued effectively with regard to reaching peak emissions around
2030, the coal cap, and the 20% renewable electricity target along
with related targets to be included in the 13th FYP that will come
on stream in 2016, it will have implications for the dominant
process of state planning. But what is the significance of this
development? Law is not unimportant in the Chinese system, but
what we can expect is an overlay of the rule of law with Chinese
characteristics in conjunction with the existing governance
process emphasizing state planning.
Some may see these developments as an indication that
environmental governance in China is shifting toward a law-
centered process, while the US is finding it increasingly difficult to
employ such practices effectively in addressing environmental
issues. This is certainly a possibility; it is important not to
overestimate the power of path dependence. In our view, however,
these developments reinforce the need to understand the institu-
tionalized processes of environmental governance in place in the
two systems in their own terms, avoiding the confusion arising from
descriptions of each system using terminology associated with the
other. In the final analysis, success in solving environmental
problems in China will occur when strong leadership produces
joint initiatives on the part of the CPC and the National People’s
Congress that lead to effective top-down pressures on lower levels of
government responsible for achieving the targets articulated in FYPs.
While executive initiatives based on existing authority may suffice
to address some environmental problems in the US, lasting progress
in dealing with major issues like climate change almost certainly
will require coordinated action on the part of the legislative and
executive branches of government.
The way forward is to work within the established governance
processes in each country, but, in doing so, to make use of a
comparative lens that helps us to understand their limits and the
potential for introducing adjustments that may be needed in both
countries as we confront the increasingly challenging environ-
mental problems of the 21st century (Steinberg and VanDeveer,
2012; Duit, 2014). There may be lessons to be drawn from the
experiences of one society that are useful to those seeking to solve
analogous problems in other societies. But this sort of reasoning is
always hazardous. We are convinced that it is essential to identify
the determinants of success and failure in the operation of specific
institutionalized governance processes and to consider opportu-
nities to maximize the effectiveness of each process in its own
terms, rather than to make general pronouncements about the
(un)desirability of these processes based on superficial compar-
isons across distinct social and political settings.
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